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Successful corporate acquisitions require its managers to achieve substantial performance
improvements in order to sufficiently cover acquisition premiums, the expected return of
debt and equity investors, and the additional resources needed to capture synergies and
accelerate growth. Acquirers understand that achieving the performance improvements
necessary to cover these costs and create value for investors will most likely require
a significant effort from mergers and acquisitions (M&A) management teams. This
understanding drives the common and longstanding practice of offering hefty performance
incentive packages to key managers, assuming that financial incentives will induce in-role
and extra-role behaviors that drive organizational change and growth. The present study
debunks the assumptions of this common M&A practice, providing quantitative evidence
that shared vision and autonomous motivation are far more effective drivers of managerial
performance than financial incentives.
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INTRODUCTION
The poor financial returns and high failure rates of mergers
and acquisitions (M&A) have been thoroughly documented.
Researchers have indicated that approximately 70–80% of merg-
ers and acquisitions do not create significant value above the
annual cost of capital (Bruner, 2002). Even conservative esti-
mates place M&A failure rates at approximately 50% or higher for
nearly four decades (Kitching, 1974; Rostand, 1994; Coffey et al.,
2003). Despite this conspicuously disappointing history, global
M&A activity continues to increase at a phenomenal rate climb-
ing from $1.9 trillion in 2004 (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006)
to a record-breaking $4.35 trillion in 2007 (Reuters, 2008). With
trillions of dollars in transactions at risk each year, it is extremely
important for researchers and practitioners to find ways to curb
M&A failures.
In order to succeed, M&As must create value for its investors
despite new costs such as servicing debt, funding growth,
and increasing return expectations to accommodate acquisition
premiums1 (Sirower, 2000). These burdens require M&A man-
agers to increase the performance of their firms to new heights.
Acquirers typically offer substantial financial incentives to induce
these managers to go above and beyond their normal job duties
to champion aggressive organizational change and growth (Hitt
et al., 2001).
This expectation is in direct conflict with social psychology
theories such as Self-Determination Theory (SDT) (Gagne and
Deci, 2005) and economic theories such as Motivation Crowding
1Acquisition premium: The actual cost of acquiring a target versus its book
value, market value, or estimated value. Sirower (2000) estimates that the
average acquisition premium is in excess of 40%.
Theory (Frey and Jegen, 2001; James, 2005) which assert that
financial incentives can reduce motivation and performance.
Certainly, the persistently high M&A failure rates suggest the
possibility that these theories apply to M&A managers.
The purpose of the present study is two-fold. First, it explores
the effects of financial incentives on the motivation and per-
formance of M&A managers. For completeness, our concept of
managerial performance includes both in-role and championing
behaviors. Second, the study explores two other practices that
are used by acquirers to increase the performance of its acquired
managers, increasing organizational support and focusing on
shared vision.
THE NEED FOR INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO M&A RESEARCH
Fifty years of M&A research have had no measurable impact
on failure rates (Cartwright, 2005). Scholars continue to be
bewildered by the conflicting and seemingly unpredictable per-
formance of mergers and acquisitions (Tichy, 2001; King et al.,
2004; Stahl and Voigt, 2004). M&A research has primarily focused
on three streams of inquiry to identify the root cause(s) of fail-
ures: strategic fit, culture fit and integration process (Cartwright
and Schoenberg, 2006). While these research paths have con-
tributed much to our understanding of organizational-level
changes related to M&A, neither has provided a consistent expla-
nation of how and why these changes affect firm performance
(King et al., 2004; Cartwright, 2005).
Scholars have offered several suppositions why existing M&A
literature has not been effective. First, although psychological
theorists consistently argue that human factors are the key to
M&A success or failure (Cartwright and Cooper, 1996; Terry,
2003), 95% of existing M&A literature focuses on organizational-
level constructs (Cartwright, 2005). This is rather surprising
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since organizational change, particularly the accelerated change
experienced by most M&As, is usually if not always mediated
through individual change (Schein, 1980; Schneider et al., 1996;
Edmonson, 1999; Devos et al., 2001). M&A literature fails to
predict the performance of merged or acquired companies sim-
ply because it cannot predict the performance of the managers
charged with running these companies (Cartwright, 2005).
Two other suppositions suggest that most M&A studies (a)
have not been theory-driven or (b) have been limited to case stud-
ies, both of which lack the generalizability to offer far-reaching
solutions (Hogan and Overmeyer-Day, 1994; Seo and Hill, 2005).
As a result, countless organizational practices have been pre-
scribed for M&A planning and integration without a sound
theoretical or empirical basis, certainly contributing to the high
rate of failures (Seo and Hill, 2005). In fact, researchers con-
cluded that “changes to both M&A theory and research may
be needed” after analyzing the inability of 93 studies to clearly
identify antecedents that consistently impact M&A performance
(King et al., 2004). Evidently, unique approaches toM&A research
is just as important as the research focus.
CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW
In a ground-breaking analysis of M&A failures, Sirower (2000)
illustrated how most M&A management teams face massive
required performance improvements (RPIs) to achieve M&A suc-
cess. The basic M&A premise involves purchasing a company at X
price, then growing its value to X + Y at some designated time
in the future. The value of Y must be sufficiently large enough
to cover the acquisition premium, the expected return of debt
and equity investors, surges in competitive activity responding
to the M&A threat, additional resources requirements needed for
growth and capturing synergies, acquisition transaction and con-
sulting costs, executive contractual costs, and many other costs
including the time value of money (Sirower, 2000). For M&A
managers, status quo performance of in-role behaviors, no mat-
ter how efficient, will no longer suffice.Management performance
must often substantially improve to meet the RPIs dictated by the
need to achieve value Y. As such, M&A managers are expected
to champion aggressive organizational change and growth to have
any chance of achieving M&A success.
Understanding this dynamic, acquirers typically focus on three
areas to improve in-role behaviors and more importantly, to
induce championing behaviors from acquired managers: finan-
cial incentives, organizational support and shared vision. The
most common and longstanding practice is to increase financial
performance incentives via some combination of stock options,
profit sharing, gain sharing or individual bonuses. In fact, acquir-
ers often establish financial incentives as part of the transaction
terms for key managers and immediately after the transaction
for other managers (Hitt et al., 2001; Cullinan et al., 2004).
Acquirers understand that any delays in achieving performance
improvements quickly compound the returns needed to accom-
modate value Y. Sirower (2000) calculated that expectations
of a 10% return on equity (ROE) would increase to approx-
imately 15% on minimal or substandard returns for the first
couple of years after an acquisition. This 50% increase in ROE
would have to be maintained for the following 7 years just to
break even. In other words, his analysis assumes no value cre-
ation, only value preservation for the acquirer. Consequently,
acquirers typically provide substantial performance incentives
expecting they will induce key managers to champion whatever
changes are necessary to achieve the acquirer’s goals. This prac-
tice is supported by empirical studies on compensation, which
in general, report a positive influence of monetary incentives
on employee and firm performance (Booth and Frank, 1999;
Lazear Edward, 2000; Gerhart and Rynes, 2003; Gagne and Forest,
2008).
Unfortunately, the exceptionally high rates of M&A failures
indicate that increasing performance incentives do not con-
sistently increase the performance of acquired managers. This
directly contradicts common practice and general compensa-
tion literature. However, economics and social psychology schol-
ars have provided theory and corresponding empirical evidence
describing certain conditions where financial incentives are inef-
fective and in fact, can actually undermine motivation and per-
formance (Gagne and Deci, 2005; James, 2005). This suggests the
presence of a mediator that suppresses the total effect of financial
incentives on performance.
This mediation effect is supported by SDT (Gagne and Deci,
2005). SDT posits that individuals perceive financial incentives as
control mechanisms. As such, financial incentives reduce individ-
uals’ autonomous motivation, that is, their willingness to act on
organizational goals according to their own volition.
Figure 1 graphically depicts the aforementioned assertions
regarding the direct and mediation effects of financial incen-
tives on in-role and championing behaviors in a single model.
The model illustrates the positive relationship between incen-
tives and performance behaviors espoused by general com-
pensation literature and M&A practice. It also illustrates the
negative mediation effect of autonomous motivation espoused
by SDT.
Providing organizational support is another common method
acquirers use to improve in-role performance and induce champi-
oning behaviors.When parent organizations actively demonstrate
a concern for acquired employees’ well-being, threat is reduced,
motivating employees to willingly reciprocate with actions that
contribute to the well-being of the organization (Gaertner et al.,
2001; Seo and Hill, 2005). Two of the most successful and
studied serial acquirers, Cisco Systems and GE Capital, both
consider their organizational support of acquired employees
during post-acquisition integration as the key to their success
(DiGeorgio, 2001). Figure 1 depicts organizational support as
positively impacting both autonomous motivation and manage-
rial performance.
Shared vision is the third common method used by M&A
practitioners to maximize performance (Douma et al., 2000;
Mitleton-Kelly, 2004; Stahl and Mendenhall, 2005). We define
shared vision as a manager’s focus and alignment toward the
new regime’s direction and purpose. M&A literature asserts that
a shared vision is essential to the successful performance of
merged and acquired organizations (Haspeslagh and Jemison,
1991; Sitkin and Pablo, 2005). J. P. Garnier, the former CEO of
GlaxoSmithKline, extensively discussed the importance of man-
agement’s focus on shared vision when analyzing GSK’s many
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FIGURE 1 | Conceptual model.
M&A successes (Stahl and Mendenhall, 2005). Cisco System
explores shared vision as part of the pre-acquisition process while
GE Capital requires its integration managers to develop shared
vision during the post-acquisition integration process as part of
their role (DiGeorgio, 2001). Per Figure 1, we posit that shared
vision positively influences both autonomous motivation and
championing behaviors.
MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE
Our definition of managerial performance consists of in-role
behaviors and championing behaviors. In-role behaviors are
defined and required by formal job descriptions (Williams
and Anderson, 1991; Riketta, 2002). They are recognized and
driven by an organization’s formal reward system (Barksdale
and Werner, 2001). Researchers most often characterize in-role
behaviors as simply “doing one’s job.”
Championing behaviors are a form of extra-role behaviors
based on the “taking charge” construct defined by Morrison and
Phelps (1999). Like other forms of extra-role behaviors, they are
discretionary actions that are not defined or enforced by formal
role obligations (Morrison and Phelps, 1999). Unlike other forms
of extra-role behaviors, they are specifically change-oriented,
describing individuals who are willing to challenge the status quo
to bring about constructive organizational change (Morrison and
Phelps, 1999). Championing behaviors describe voluntary efforts
to continuously improve organizational functioning. Researchers
have statistically confirmed their relation to but distinction from
other forms of extra-role behaviors (Morrison and Phelps, 1999;
Chiaburu and Baker, 2006).
THE DIRECT EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVES ON IN-ROLE
PERFORMANCE
Performance incentives for acquired managers can take several
forms. Table 1 lists the most common incentives categorized by
their basis of evaluation. Researchers over the past decade have
consistently reported that at least 95% of U.S. companies provide
performance incentives with approximately 35% of those com-
panies providing individual-based incentives and 60% providing
organizational-based incentives (Bucklin and Dickinson, 2001;
McGee et al., 2006). Because increasing performance is so essen-
tial to the success of mergers and acquisitions (Sirower, 2000), we
suspect that an even higher percentage of M&As provide some
form of performance incentives.
This common practice of using performance incentives is
based on research on compensation showing financial incen-
tives have a positive effect on employee performance (Gerhart
and Rynes, 2003) with studies showing a 4–9% increase in firm
performance (Booth and Frank, 1999; Lazear Edward, 2000;
Gagne and Forest, 2008). Because financial strategists dominate
M&A literature and practice (Sudarsanam, 2003; Cartwright,
2005), it is not surprising that they have adopted the per-
spective supported by the financial literature regarding com-
pensation. M&A literature specifically recommends performance
incentives that range from “cash compensation for particular
actions to stock options and equity ownership” (Hitt et al.,
2001), to drive “stimulating sustained, vigorous performance”
(Larsson and Finkelstein, 2002), because “incentives matter a
great deal in determining the success of an acquisition (Kaplan,
2000).
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Table 1 | Common performance incentives for managers.
Evaluation basis Performance incentive Description Major pros and cons
Individual
performance
Individual performance
bonus
Cash compensation based on achieving individual
goals. Funded by pre-determined budget set
aside for bonuses
Pros: Excellent influence on individual
performance. Cons: Promotes self-interest and
competition among peers
Organizational
performance
Profit sharing bonus Cash or deferred compensation based on the
economic performance of the firm. Funded by
firm profits
Pros: Signals willingness to share wealth with
workforce. Easy to administer. Cons: Weak
influence on day to day individual performance
Organizational
performance
Gainsharing bonus Cash compensation based on specific short or
long-term operational goals. Funded by cost
savings, increased revenue or productivity gains
Pros: Good to excellent influence on individual
performance depending on the size of the group.
Promotes cooperation, team work and positive
peer pressure. Cons: Can be difficult to
administer and keep current
Organizational
performance
Stock or stock options Stock or the right to purchase stock at a fixed
price. Funded by the sale of the firm or of the
firm’s stock
Pros: Easy to administer. Can be a substantial
amount. Cons: Weak influence on day to day
individual performance
From a theoretical perspective, the direct effect of incen-
tives on performance is based on the economic exchange model
(Blau, 1964) that promises specific benefits from the organiza-
tion in return for specific contributions from employees (Tsui
et al., 1997). Equity Theory, one of many theories that utilize
the economic exchange model, asserts that employees strive to
balance the contributions they provide relative to the benefits
they receive (Adams, 1965; Cropanzano et al., 2007). According
to Equity Theory, financial incentives should positively influence
the performance of an individual’s specified behaviors, that is,
in-role behaviors. Accordingly, studies have supported a positive
correlation between performance incentives and in-role behav-
iors (Deckop et al., 1999), specifically referring to it as the
pay-performance link (Bucklin and Dickinson, 2001).
Hypothesis 1: Individual performance incentives positively influence
in-role behaviors after controlling for autonomous motivation.
Hypothesis 2: Organizational performance incentives positively
influence in-role behaviors after controlling for autonomous moti-
vation.
Compensation specialists have historically cited the pay-
performance link to be the most important factor in determining
the influence that financial incentives have on an individual’s per-
formance (Bucklin and Dickinson, 2001). The strength of the
pay-performance link depends on the amount of control an indi-
vidual has over achieving the targeted goals (McGee et al., 2006).
The more control one has over achieving the goals, the more
control he has over his pay.
One has much more control over achieving individual-based
goals than group-based goals (McGee et al., 2006). Simply put,
the less people involved in achieving a goal, the more that a single
participant can control the outcome. In addition, organizational
performance incentives are based on the impact of operational or
economic outcomes on the firm, many of which depend on exter-
nal variables that are clearly beyond the control of management
(Bucklin and Dickinson, 2001) such as the economy, government
regulation, customer demand, and competitor strategies. Even
controllable variables such as productivity and quality are an
aggregate based on the performance of all employees, meaning
that an individual may perceive his contribution as insignificant
toward achieving the incentive (FitzRoy and Kraft, 1995; Hall and
Murphy, 2003). As a result, individuals may have difficulty seeing
the connection between group-based incentives and their day-to-
day performance of in-role behaviors (Bucklin and Dickinson,
2001; Hall and Murphy, 2003).
Hypothesis 3: Individual performance incentives have a stronger
(more positive) influence on in-role behaviors than organizational
performance incentives.
THE MEDIATING EFFECTS OF AUTONOMOUS MOTIVATION ON
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
Mediating effects on financial incentives are not considered by the
economic exchange based theories that dominate compensation
research and practice (Frey and Osterloh, 2005; Gagne and Forest,
2008). However, numerous studies have explored how certain
conditions can cause tangible incentives to underminemotivation
and performance (Gagne andDeci, 2005; James, 2005). This “hid-
den cost of reward” was first identified and researched by social
psychologists as far back as 1971 (Titmuss, 1971; Lepper and
Greene, 1978; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). Over the years,
this concept has been included in many theoretical approaches to
work motivation and performance such as Cognitive Evaluation
Theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985) and Motivation Crowding Theory
(Frey and Jegen, 2001; James, 2005).
SDT posits that the perceptions of tangible incentives regu-
late an individual’s motivation and behaviors (Deci and Ryan,
2000; Ryan and Deci, 2000a; Sheldon et al., 2003; Gagne and Deci,
2005). Referring to Figure 2, the Self-Determination Continuum,
the source of regulation describes the reasons that individuals
act on the organizational goals. When an individual generally
regards organizational goals as personally important, meaning-
ful or interesting, they are internalized or internally valued by the
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FIGURE 2 | Self-determination continuum.
individual (Ryan and Connell, 1989; Sheldon et al., 2003; Gagne
and Forest, 2008). High degrees of internalization enhance an
individual’s perceived autonomy, resulting in their willing inten-
tion to act on organizational goals (Deci and Ryan, 1987; Gagne
and Deci, 2005). SDT defines this willing intention to act as
autonomous motivation. Conversely, an individual that generally
regards organizational goals with low degrees of internalization
will only act on them to receive a reward, avoid a punishment or
achieve the approval of others (Ryan andDeci, 2000a;Meyer et al.,
2004). SDT refers to this as controlled motivation.
Figure 2 depicts the sources of regulation that include exter-
nal rewards increase controlled motivation while reducing
autonomous motivation. SDT states that individuals perceive
tangible rewards as control mechanisms, attempting to force or
coerce them into acting on organizational goals. SDT posits that
tangible rewards reduce autonomous motivation.
Hypothesis 4: Individual performance incentives negatively influence
autonomous motivation.
Hypothesis 5: Organizational performance incentives negatively
influence autonomous motivation.
Researchers have proposed that organizational commitment
is actually a component of work motivation (Meyer and
Herscovitch, 2001; Meyer et al., 2004). Empirical research has
confirmed considerable overlap between both major conceptual-
izations of organizational commitment (O’Reilly and Chatman,
1986; Meyer and Allen, 1991) and the SDT framework of
work motivation (Gagne and Deci, 2005; Gagné et al., 2009).
Affective organizational commitment, characterized as the willing
desire to identify with an organization was specifically linked to
autonomous motivation (Gagné and Koestner, 2002; Gagné et al.,
2004; Gagne and Deci, 2005).
A number of studies have linked affective organizational com-
mitment to in-role and extra-role behaviors. Researchers have
established a significant overlap between affective organizational
commitment and autonomous motivation. In a meta-analysis
of 93 published studies, affective organizational commitment
was found to (a) positively influence in-role behaviors, (b) to
positively influence extra-role behaviors, and (c) to influence
extra-role behaviors significantly more than in-role behaviors
(Riketta, 2002). Similar results were also reported in a separate
meta-analysis of 155 independent samples involving more than
50,000 employees (Meyer et al., 2002).
Hypothesis 6: Autonomous motivation positively influences in-role
behaviors.
Hypothesis 7: Autonomous motivation positively influences champi-
oning behaviors.
Hypothesis 8: Autonomous motivation has a stronger (more positive)
influence on championing behaviors than in-role behaviors.
Hypotheses 1 through 8 establish autonomous motivation
as a mediator of the influence that performance incentives
have on in-role and championing behaviors. Because SDT
posits a negative relationship between financial incentives and
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autonomous motivation, our hypothesized model conceptualizes
that autonomous motivation negatively mediates the impact of
incentives on managerial performance. This is in accordance with
SDT but directly conflicts with M&A practice.
Hypothesis 9: Autonomous motivation negatively mediates the influ-
ence of individual performance incentives on in-role behaviors.
Hypothesis 10: Autonomous motivation negatively mediates the
influence of organizational performance incentives on in-role behav-
iors.
Hypothesis 11: Autonomous motivation negatively mediates the
influence of individual performance incentives on championing
behaviors.
Hypothesis 12: Autonomous motivation negatively mediates the
influence of organizational performance incentives on championing
behaviors.
THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT ON MANAGERIAL
PERFORMANCE
The present study conceptualizes organizational support through
the perceptions of each individual manager. Perceived organiza-
tional support (POS) captures an individual’s beliefs concerning
the degree to which an organization values their contributions
and cares about their well-being (Eisenberger et al., 1986). POS
develops from an employee’s personification of the organiza-
tion and its intent toward favorable or unfavorable treatment
and working conditions (Rhoades and Eisenberger, 2002). High
levels of POS indicate a work environment that is likely to
exhibit fair treatment, participation in decision-making, career
development and training, job security, recognition, supervi-
sor support and a strong sense of belonging (Wayne et al.,
1997; Rhoades and Eisenberger, 2002; Masterson and Stamper,
2003).
Social Exchange Theory (SET), a foundation for understand-
ing the relationships between individuals and their organizations,
posits that an individual is likely to reciprocate the favorable
or unfavorable treatment received from an organization (Blau,
1964). On the basis of SET, POS should drive an individual’s
willing desire to act on behalf of the organization (Rhoades
and Eisenberger, 2002). In a meta-analysis of over 70 studies on
the antecedents and outcomes of POS, Rhoades and Eisenberger
(2002) identified a strong and consistent positive relationship
between POS and affective commitment. Given the established
relationship between affective organizational commitment and
autonomous motivation, we propose the following:
Hypothesis 13: Organizational support positively influences
autonomous motivation.
Rhoades and Eisenberger’s meta-analysis (2002) also reports that
extra-role behaviors toward the organization as a significant
outcome of POS. A recent study corroborates those findings,
specifically confirming that POS is the antecedent to extra-role
behaviors (Chen et al., 2009).
Hypothesis 14: Organizational support positively influences champi-
oning behaviors.
Hypotheses 6, 7, 13, and 14 establish autonomous motivation as
a mediator of the influence that organizational support has on
in-role and championing behaviors. The positive effects concep-
tualized for each hypothesis posits that autonomous motivation
positively mediates the impact of organizational support on man-
agerial performance.
Hypothesis 15: Autonomous motivation positively mediates the influ-
ence of organizational support on in-role behaviors.
Hypothesis 16: Autonomous motivation positively mediates the influ-
ence of organizational support on championing behaviors.
THE EFFECTS OF SHARED VISION ON MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE
M&A literature asserts that a shared vision, defined as a common
direction and purpose among anM&A’s leaders and employees, is
essential to its successful performance (Haspeslagh and Jemison,
1991; Sitkin and Pablo, 2005). A shared vision of an organization’s
future must be consistently encouraged and communicated to
take root, spread and foster an environment of excellence (Senge,
1990). An effective shared vision provides the focus, direction
and purpose for day-to-day individual efforts. They remind us of
the meaning and importance of our work (Boyatzis and McKee,
2005).
Shared vision is particularly important in M&A environ-
ments because it is a bonding mechanism that helps different
parts of an organization combine resources which promotes
the integration of the entire organization (Tsai and Ghoshal,
1998). At an individual level, shared vision creates an emotional
bond between an employee and his organization, providing a
common identity and sense of belonging (Senge, 1990; Dvir
et al., 2004). This sense of belonging enhances relatedness, which
according to SDT, increases autonomous motivation In other
words, an individual who agrees with or is inspired by the orga-
nization’s vision is more likely to willingly act on behalf of
the organization (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1995; Dvir et al.,
2004).
Hypothesis 17: Shared vision positively influences autonomous moti-
vation.
Intentional Change Theory posits that shared vision drives
the types of behaviors that cultivate and sustain individual,
group and organizational change (Akrivou et al., 2006; Boyatzis,
2006; Van-Oosten, 2006). We contend that these behaviors
are closely related, if not identical to championing behaviors.
Championing behaviors consist of discretionary conduct focused
on implementing constructive organizational change (Morrison
and Phelps, 1999; Chiaburu and Baker, 2006).
Hypothesis 18: Shared vision positively influences championing
behaviors.
Hypotheses 6, 7, 17, and 18 establish autonomous motivation
as a mediator of the influence that shared vision has on in-role
and championing behaviors. The positive effects conceptualized
for each hypothesis posit that autonomous motivation positively
mediates the impact of shared vision on managerial performance.
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Hypothesis 19: Autonomous motivation positively mediates the influ-
ence of shared vision on in-role behaviors.
Hypothesis 20: Autonomous motivation positively mediates the influ-
ence of shared vision on championing behaviors.
RESEARCH METHODS
SAMPLE
The study focuses on mergers and acquisitions owned by pri-
vate equity firms. Private equity firms typically have a 5–7 year
turnaround timetable for their investments (Flanigan, 2005).
To this end, managers must implement aggressive, short-term
growth strategies designed to quickly improve the firm’s perfor-
mance to levels never before achieved. The study targets firms
that were acquired at least 3 months prior to the survey. M&As
less than 3 months old have not had sufficient time for changes in
financial incentives to have an effect on the attitudes and behav-
iors of acquired managers. Three months is a common milestone
used by M&A practitioners to judge the direction of early-stage
change implementation (DiGeorgio, 2001; Bertoncelj and Kovacˇ,
2007).
Companies owned by private equity provide an excellent cli-
mate to evaluate the drivers of managerial performance. Private
equity ownership fosters an environment of time-constrained,
aggressive-growth expectations that require high levels of in-role
and championing behaviors from M&A managers.
The sample consists of CEOs, senior managers and middle
managers from 54 M&As owned by a large private equity firm
headquartered in North America The M&As are middle market
companies with revenues ranging from $5–500 million annu-
ally that compete in a variety of industries. The study defines
senior managers as those who report directly to the CEO or presi-
dent and middle managers as one or two reporting levels below
senior managers. The sample provides a comprehensive repre-
sentation of managers that receive individual and organizational
based performance incentives. CEOs and senior manages usually
participate in incentive plans based on stock performance, receiv-
ing stock or stock options. Middle managers usually participate
in incentive plans based on organizational performance such as
gainsharing or profit sharing. Both senior and middle managers
commonly receive incentives based on individual performance in
addition to stock or organizational incentives. Table 2 provides a
description of the respondents who completed surveys.
DATA COLLECTION
The researchers developed an online survey designed to collect
self-report data regarding performance incentives, motivation,
shared vision and organizational support. A secondary survey and
procedure were designed to collect performance data from each
respondent’s immediate supervisor. Unfortunately, the sponsor-
ing organization did not approve the secondary survey for dis-
tribution to its managers. Therefore, the researchers expanded
the primary survey to include self-reported performance. IRB
exemption was obtained but all protocols governing use of human
subjectgs were followed. Out of 500 managers solicited, 306
returned completed surveys for a 61% response rate.
Measures
Each of the measures used to develop the survey were based on
existing validated scales using 5 point Likert responses with the
exception of the performance incentive measures and controls.
The performance incentive items simply reported the level of
financial inducements as a percentage of base salary. The controls
were reported management level or demographic information.
Performance incentives
Individual performance incentives are financial bonuses based
solely on the performance of the manager in relation to for-
mal job duties. Organizational performance incentives are finan-
cial rewards based on the performance of the organization.
Organizational incentives include profit sharing bonuses, gain-
sharing bonuses and stock options. Being a report of factual data,
these items followed the standard practice of measuring finan-
cial incentives as percentages or multiples of base salary (Murphy
et al., 1999).
Autonomous motivation
The items chosen to measure autonomous motivation were
adapted from the Relative Autonomy Index (RAI) originally
developed by Ryan and Connell (1989) and its subsequent adap-
tations (Williams and Deci, 1996; Black and Deci, 2000). The
Relative Autonomy Index measured each type of motivation
described by SDT according to its degree of autonomy (Millette
and Gagné, 2008). The RAI is computed by subtracting the scores
from its controlled motivation subscale from its autonomous
motivation subscale, such that the more positive scores indicate
higher levels of autonomous motivation (Deci and Ryan, 2008).
However, according to Deci and Ryan (2008), analyses can also
be conducted using either of the two subscales. Three items for
each subscale were selected for this study—the item numbers
correspond to the item number in the original scales.
Organizational support
The researchers chose five items from the nine-item version of
the POS scale (Eisenberger et al., 1990; Wayne et al., 1997) to
operationalize organizational support. The POS scale describes
employee perceptions about the extent an organization values
Table 2 | Description of respondents.
Management level (MLVL) Acquisition age (AAGE) Age (PAGE) Tenure (PTEN) Gender (PGEN
CEOs 23 8% 90 days—3 years 120 39% 18–29 68 22% <3 years 98 32% Male 254 83%
Senior managers 90 29% 3+ year 186 61% 30–44 154 50% 3–10 years 96 31% Female 52 17%
Middle managers 191 62% 45+ 84 27% 10+ years 112 37%
Non-managers 2 1%
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their contributions and cares about their well-being. The items
were selected because of their more consistent Cronbach’s alpha
coefficients of 0.81–0.93 as compared to the original (36-item)
and revised (17-item) versions with reliabilities ranging from.074
to.095 (Wayne et al., 1997; Moorman et al., 1998; Fields, 2002).
The five items selected for this study have the item numbers
corresponding to the item number in the original scale.
Shared vision
Five items were selected from the vision subscale of the PNEA
Survey (Boyatzis, 2008) to measure shared vision. The PNEA
vision subscale measures the respondent’s focus on and alignment
with the organization’s vision. The five items were chosen (from
eight items in the referenced subscale) because of their particu-
lar relevance to the context of the present study. The five items
selected for this study have the item numbers corresponding to
the item number in the original scale.
In-role behaviors
Managerial in-role behaviors were assessed using five items
adapted from a multi-dimensional scale designed to measure
employee performance in the workplace (Williams and Anderson,
1991; Turnley et al., 2003). The in-role behaviors subscale specif-
ically measures behaviors recognized by the formal reward sys-
tem (Williams and Anderson, 1991; Turnley et al., 2003). This
measure has been extensively used for peer, supervisor and self-
reports (Fields, 2002).
Championing behaviors
Championing behaviors were measured by the “taking charge”
scale which was developed to assess an individual’s discretionary
actions toward organizational change (Morrison and Phelps,
1999). These types of extra-role behaviors challenge the sta-
tus quo by implementing changes or correcting problems in
an effort to constructively improve organizational functioning.
Championing behaviors are distinctively different from the altru-
istic, conscientious or civic virtue behaviors measured by most
extra-role or organizational citizenship instruments and there-
fore, require a specific assessment tool (Morrison and Phelps,
1999; Chiaburu and Baker, 2006). The researchers chose the tak-
ing charge scale to operationalize championing behaviors because
it targets the aggressive, change-oriented behaviors most M&As
require from their managers to succeed. Five items were adapted
to weigh the respondent’s efforts toward solving pressing orga-
nizational problems or implementing new systems, technologies
or methodologies, all of which are essential for accelerating M&A
growth and performance.
Control variables
The influence of incentives, organizational support and shared
vision may also vary with managerial hierarchy. Higher-level
managers are likely to have different informational and interper-
sonal relationships with parent organizations, which could result
in different attitudes (Tsui et al., 1997). A multigroup analysis was
conducted to evaluate structural model invariance across senior
managers and middle managers. The process involves compar-
ing the goodness of fit between a model with structural paths
constrained equal across groups to a model with no constraints
(Byrne, 2001). A significant difference in chi-square indicates
the models are not invariant, warranting each constraint to be
released, one at a time, to pinpoint the specific paths causing the
variance.
Multigroup analysis was also used to assess model invariance
of managers under 45 years old to those 45 and older. Part of
the M&A due diligence effort, when considering an acquisition,
is to evaluate the management team. While some acquirers prefer
younger management teams, feeling they are more flexible and
dynamic, other acquirers prefer older management teams, feel-
ing they are more experienced and knowledgeable (Wiersema and
Bantel, 1992). The multigroup analyses was undertaken to iden-
tify if performance incentives, organizational support and shared
vision affected the behaviors of senior and middle managers
differently.
Other factors may impact M&A managers as well. Gender and
company tenure are often considered as human capital factors
that influence workplace performance (Tsui et al., 1997). As such,
we included these items as control variables.
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Normality, homoscedasticity and multicollinearity were exam-
ined; extreme outliers and influentials removed, and linear rela-
tionships were confirmed. An exploratory factor analysis (EFA)
followed to uncover the latent structure of the measurement
model in relation to a priori assumptions. The resulting measure-
ment model was then subjected to a confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) to assess its fit to the data using structural equation model-
ing (SEM) methodologies. The researchers used SPSS and AMOS
statistical software packages to conduct data and measurement
model analyses.
Common method variance was of particular concern in
the present study because the survey instrument was adminis-
tered at the same time, in the same context, to single respon-
dents, all of which can contribute to inflating the relationships
between constructs (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Friedrich et al., 2009).
Podsakoff et al. (2003) advocated the single-common-method-
factor approach to control for CMV, particularly when the predic-
tor and criterion measures were obtained from the same source
and in the same context, as in this case. The procedure calls for
establishing a latent factor in themeasurementmodel which loads
on each observed item. The main advantage of this approach is
that it does not require the researcher to identify andmeasure spe-
cific causes of CMV. Unfortunately however, this approach also
reflects the variance for other unmeasured variables in addition
to CMV (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Other disadvantages include the
tendency for this approach to result in under-identified models,
particularly when the number of items is small in relation to the
number of constructs, as in this case. As a solution to this prob-
lem, some researchers constrain the CMV factor loadings to be
equal (Podsakoff et al., 2003).We referenced this approach to con-
trol for CMV during the analyses of measurement and structural
models.
Prior to analyzing the hypothesized structural model, conver-
gent and discriminant validity of the constructs as well as their
internal reliability were assessed and confirmed. SEM techniques
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were then used to evaluate the causal relationships between the
constructs in the structural model (Fornell and Larcker, 1981;
Byrne, 2001). Goodness of fit statistics included measures com-
paring predicted vs. observed covariances (chi-square, relative
chi-square, and SRMR), default vs. independence models (CFI,
NFI, and TLI), and predicted vs. observed covariances penalized
for lack of parsimony (RMSEA). To summarize the causal rela-
tionships between constructs, the r2 statistics for each mediating
and dependent variable were tabulated with the unstandardized
regression coefficient and t-value for each of its contributing
explanatory variables.
Mediation testing followed the approach advocated by
Mathieu and Taylor (2006). This approach incorporates itera-
tive, systematic techniques designed to test for partial mediation,
full mediation and indirect effects models. Its primary focus is
on identifying indirect effects, specifically those that may sup-
press the total effects between predictor and criterion variables,
causing many researchers to overlook important mediating rela-
tionships. The a priori assumptions of suppression effects in our
hypothesized model warranted the use of this approach.
Finally, we examined the effects of the designated controls on
our results. Management level and participant age were of par-
ticular interest. Therefore, multigroup analysis procedures were
used to test the invariance of our model across senior and middle
managers, as well as managers under and over 45 years old. Both
measurement and structural models were tested for invariance.
RESULTS
SEM requires sample sizes greater than 200 with five to ten cases
per observed variable (Kline, 2005; Hair et al., 2006). The original
dataset consisted of 306 cases and 28 observed variables, meet-
ing the data adequacy requirements for SEM. Subsequent analyses
resulted in a final dataset of 285 cases and 20 observed variables,
still exceeding the minimum requirements for SEM.
The pre-screening process identified two cases of respondents
who were not CEOs, senior managers or middle managers. The
cases were removed from the dataset. SPSS generated box plots,
stem and leaf diagrams, and histograms as well as skewness and
kurtosis values were examined to confirm acceptable normality of
the observed variables. The analysis resulted in the identification
and removal of 11 outliers from the dataset.
Each dependent variable was regressed on all independent
variables which confirmed linear relationships suitable for SEM
analysis. For each regression, SPSS generated plots of the stan-
dardized residuals against the standardized predicted value to
confirm homoscedasticity of the variables. Finally, the regressions
also produced collinearity statistics, confirming that all tolerance
and VIF statistics were below the acceptable multicollinearity
thresholds of<0.10 and>10, respectively (Kline, 2005).
An EFA was conducted using Principal Axis Factoring and
Promax rotation to uncover the minimum number of factors
required to account for the maximum amount of common vari-
ance assuming oblique relationships, not orthogonal. Twenty-
eight observed variables were loaded into SPSS for EFA analysis.
The items measuring individual and organizational performance
incentives were not included in EFA. These measures assessed the
amount and type of incentives reported by the respondents. As
Table 3 | Simultaneous EFA of observed variables with rotated factor
loadings (n-285, EFA conducted with principal axis factoring and
promax rotation and kaisaer normalization).
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
AUTONOMOUS MOTIVATION (AMOT)
AREG1 0.620
AREG3 0.896
AREG 6 0.833
ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT (OSUP)
OSUP1 0.588
OSUP4r 0.898
OSUP5 0.950
SHARED VISION (SVIS)
SVIS1 0.952
SVIS2 0.919
SVIS3 0.842
IN-RLE BEHAVIORS (IBEH)
IBEH1 0.962
IBEH3 0.858
IBEH5 0.916
CHAMPIONING BEHAVIORS (CBEH)
CBEH1 0.522
CBEH2 0.505
CBEH3 0.773
CBEH4 1.047
such, they were single item measures that did not indicate latent
variables. The initial EFA resulted in a five factor solution with
most variables loading as hypothesized. However, several of the
items had cross-loadings within 0.200, had factor loadings below
0.500, or would improve the Cronbach’s alpha of the construct if
it were deleted. After several iterations, a total of 10 items were
removed, resulting in a clean five factor solution as depicted in
Table 3.
Referring to Table 3, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and
Bartlett’s test of sphericity values both exceeded the desired
thresholds of greater than 0.6 and less than 0.05, respectively.
KMO predicted the data would factor well while the Bartlett’s test
indicated acceptable correlation between variables. Five factors
with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 were extracted accounting for
72.8% of the total variance. All items loaded according to hypoth-
esized groupings and exhibited relatively high and close within
each factor. That is, with the exception of CBEH (Championing
Behaviors). The large spread between the maximum and min-
imum loadings was cause for concern. However, the construct
proved to exhibit both discriminant and convergent validity
(confirmed in a following section) and so, the four items were
retained.
The CMV factor loadings were statistically significant indicat-
ing that common method variance would have biased the results
had we not controlled for it. All goodness of fit statistics pre-
sented in this study were calculated from models that controlled
for CMV. It was not only model fit indices which accounted
for CMV, but also the regression weights in the structural
model.
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Table 4 | Convergent and discriminant validity statistics.
Constructs/Dimensions Coefficientsa T -value Cronbach’s Alpha CRb AVEc MSVd ASVe
Autonomous motivation (AMOT) 0.80 0.74 0.50 0.42 0.25
AREG1 0.544 7.500
AREG3 0.818 13.311
AREG6 0.728 11.284
Organizational support (OSUP) 0.87 0.82 0.61 0.20 0.11
OSUP1 0.613 9.209
OSUP4r 0.848 13.832
OSUP5 0.853 14.898
Shared vision (SVIS) 0.93 0.89 0.74 0.31 0.20
SVIS1 0.909 17.484
SVIS2 0.896 17.217
SVIS5 0.758 13.161
In-role behaviors (IBEH) 0.93 0.87 0.70 0.09 0.04
IBEH1 0.855 14.461
IBEH3 0.762 11.650
IBEH5 0.880 15.102
Championing behaviors (CBEH) 0.86 0.78 0.48 0.42 0.22
CBEH1 0.848 13.456
CBEH2 0.785 12.441
CBEH3 0.436 5.505
CBEH4 0.638 9.260
aStandardized factor loadings.
bComposite Reliability.
cAverage Variance Extracted.
dMaximium Shared Variance
eAverage Shared Variance.
After controlling for common method variance, the reliability
and validity of each construct were assessed utilizing standard-
ized factor loadings, composite reliabilities (CR), average variance
extracted (AVE), maximum shared variance (MSV), and average
shared variance (ASV) (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Hair et al.,
2006). The criteria for convergent validity includes standard-
ized factor loadings >0.50, AVE > 0.50, and CR > 0.70. Per
Table 4, all variables and constructs exceed desired thresholds
except for the AVE of the Championing Behaviors construct and
the standardized coefficient of one of its items, CBEH3. However,
because the EFA inferred potential issues with different CBEH
variables and based on the strength of other statistics, particu-
larly Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability, no changes were
made. Each construct also met the criteria for internal reliabil-
ity with a Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability exceed-
ing 0.70 (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Nunnally and Bernstein,
1994).
AVE varies from 0 to 1, and it represents the ratio of the
total variance that is due to the latent variable. Using the logic
as presented earlier, an AVE of 0.5 or more indicates satisfactory
convergent validity, as it means that the latent construct accounts
for 50% or more of the variance in the observed variables, on the
average. If AVE is less than 0.5, the variance due to measurement
error is larger than the variance captured by the construct, and
the validity of the individual indicators, as well as the construct,
is questionable. Note that AVE is a more conservative measure
Table 5 | SEM goodness of fit statistics for the structural model.
Goodness of fit Criteria for Initial Respecified
good fit structural model structural model
FIT OF PREDICTED VS. OBSERVED COVARIANCES
Chi-square (df) N/A 391.7 (151) 363.1 (148)
Relative chi-square
(CMIN/DF)
<3.0a 2.6 2.1
SRMR ≤0.08b 0.06 0.05
FIT OF DEFAULT VS. INDEPENDENCE MODELS
CFI ≥0.95b 0.93 0.94
NFI ≥0.90c 0.90 0.91
TLI ≥0.95b 0.91 0.92
FIT OF PREDICTED VS. OBSERVED COVARIANCES BUT
RMSEA (90% CI) ≤0.06b 0.075 (0.066–0.084) 0.072 (0.062–0.081)
aKline (1998).
bHu and Bentler (1999).
cBentler and Bonett (1980).
than CR. On the basis of CR alone, the researcher may conclude
that the convergent validity of the construct is adequate, even
thoughmore than 50% of the variance is due to error. One should
also interpret the standardized parameter estimates to ensure that
they aremeaningful and in accordance with theory (Malhotra and
Dash, 2011, p. 702).
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Table 6 | Statistical relationships between structural model constructs.
Dependent variable R-square Independent variables Unstandardized coefficient T -value Standard error
Autonomous motivation (AMOT) 0.41 Individual performance incentives (IINC) 0.038 1.62 0.024
Organizational performance incentives (OINC) 0.019 1.36 0.014
Organizational support (OSUP) 0.134 3.45 0.039
Shared vision (SVIS) 0.190 4.47 0.042
In-role behaviors (IBEH) 0.18 Individual performance incentives (I-INC) 0.107 2.70 0.039
Organizational performance incentives (OINC) −0.021 −0.85 0.024
Shared vision (S-VIS) 0.169 2.78 0.061
Organizational support (OSUP) −0.131 −2.37 0.055
Autonomous motivation (AMOT) 0.185 1.19 0.155
Championing behaviors (CBEH) 0.50 Individual performance incentives (I-INC) −0.115 −3.90 0.029
Organizational support (OSUP) 0.064 1.55 0.041
Shared vision (SVIS) 0.158 3.57 0.044
Autonomous motivation (AMOT) 0.672 5.06 0.133
To evaluate discriminant validity, AVE for each construct must
be >0.50 and exceed the values of MSV and ASV (Fornell and
Larcker, 1981). Again, all constructs exceed desired thresholds
except for Championing Behaviors. Because its AVE is greater
than itsMSV or ASV and based on the strengths of other statistics,
the Championing Behaviors construct was considered to have
acceptable discriminant validity.
The hypothesized structural model was developed and eval-
uated in AMOS. It should be noted that all structural model
statistics were calculated after inclusion of the control variables
acquisition age (AAGE), participant tenure (PTEN, and partic-
ipant gender PGEN). Table 5 contains the resulting goodness
of fit statistics. The initial model approached good fit, how-
ever, the modification indices suggested that the addition of
three regression paths would improve model fit. Paths from
Individual Performance Incentives to Championing Behaviors,
Organizational Support to In-Role Behaviors, and Shared Vision
to In-Role Behaviors were added to the model and analyzed.
While the fit did not improve much, all added paths were sta-
tistically significant and therefore, were retained in the final
structural model. The respecified model and impact of these non-
hypothesized paths will be discussed at length in the Findings and
Discussion sections.
Table 6 lists the statistical relationships between the con-
structs in the final structural model. The r2 statistic represents
the amount of variability in the dependent variable that can be
explained by the independent variables. The unstandardized coef-
ficient indicates raw strength of the influence of each independent
variable on the dependent variable. Finally, the t-value provides
the significance of each coefficient. A graphical representation
of the structural model summarizing the statistical relationships
between constructs is shown in Figure 3.
The researchers evaluated the mediating effects of
Autonomous Motivation using techniques developed by
Mathieu and Taylor (2006). These techniques constrain each path
in a mediated relationship in an iterative process to determine
their significance using methods such as the Sobel test and
bootstrapping (Mathieu and Taylor, 2006). Mathieu and Taylor
Table 7 | Mediation effects.
Hypothesized mediated paths Mediation effect of autonomous
motivation (A-MOT)
Individual incentives (I-INC) ⇒ In-role
behaviors (I-BEH)
No mediation; direct effect
Individual incentives (I-INC) ⇒
Championing behaviors (C-BEH)
Partial mediation
Organizational incentives (O-INC) ⇒
In-role behaviors (I-BEH)
No mediation
Organizational incentives (O-INC) ⇒
Championing behaviors (C-BEH)
No mediation
Organizational support (O-SUP) ⇒
In-role behaviors (I-BEH)
No mediation; direct effect
Organizational support (O-SUP) ⇒
Championing behaviors (C-BEH)
Indirect effects mediation
Shared vision (S-VIS) ⇒ In-role
behaviors (I-BEH)
No mediation
Shared vision (S-VIS) ⇒ Championing
behaviors (C-BEH)
Partial mediation
(2006) assert that these techniques will identify indirect effects
that other methods will reject. Indirect effects describe variables
that mediate the relationship between independent and depen-
dent variables that are not significantly correlated to each other.
In other words, the absence of significant total effect between
independent and dependent variables often cause researchers to
mistakenly reject significant mediated relationships. Table 7 lists
a summary of the results of mediation testing.
A multigroup analysis (Jöreskog, 1971; Byrne, 2001) assessed
the moderating effects of senior vs. middle managers and man-
agers under 45 years old vs. those over 45. The analysis for
each group was conducted in three steps. First, the factor load-
ings of the AMOS measurement model were constrained equal
and compared to the unconstrained model. A significant dif-
ference between each model’s chi-square at a 90% confidence
interval served as the threshold to reject the null hypothesis that
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Table 8 | Results of multigroup analysis for managers over and under 45 years old.
Construct paths Under 45 45 and over
Coefficient T -value Coefficient T -value
Individual incentives (IINC) ⇒ In-role behaviors (IBEH) 0.132 2.078 0.114 1.058
Individual incentives (IINC) ⇒ Championing behaviors (CBEH) −0.278 −4.278 −0.185 −2.006
Individual incentives (IINC) ⇒ Autonomous motivation (AMOT) 0.020 0.501 0.173 2.846
Organizational incentives (O-INC) ⇒ In-role behaviors (I-BEH) −0.179 −2.627 −0.033 −0.298
Organizational incentives (OINC) ⇒ Autonomous motivation (AMOT) 0.133 3.115 −0.130 −2.295
Organizational support (O-SUP) ⇒ In-role behaviors (I-BEH) −0.202 −2.910 0.196 1.673
Organizational support (O-SUP) ⇒ Championing behaviors (C-BEH) 0.259 3.575 0.137 1.285
Organizational support (O-SUP) ⇒ Autonomous motivation (AMOT) 0.125 2.887 0.233 3.177
Shared vision (S-VIS) ⇒ In-role behaviors (I-BEH) 0.146 1.931 0.388 2.975
Shared vision (S-VIS) ⇒ Championing behaviors (C-BEH) 0.283 3.465 0.254 2.633
Shared vision (S-VIS) ⇒ Autonomous motivation (AMOT) 0.262 5.307 0.226 2.965
Autonomous motivation (AMOT) ⇒ In-role behaviors (I-BEH) 0.570 4.023 −0.152 −0.465
Autonomous motivation (AMOT) ⇒ Championing behaviors (C-BEH) 0.346 2.486 0.151 0.494
Coefficients listed are unstandardized regression weights.
FIGURE 3 | Path diagram.
the measurement model was invariant across groups. Because
the measurement model was not invariant across management
level or age groups, each constraint was released and compared
via subsequent models to determine which specific factors were
non-invariant. Finally, the non-invariant factors were allowed to
estimate freely, which raised the chi-square significance to 0.183
for senior vs. middle managers and 0.083 for managers under vs.
over 45 years old.
A similar procedure was used to assess structural model invari-
ance. The causal paths between constructs were constrained equal
and compared across groups. Interestingly, all paths were invari-
ant across management level groups while none of the paths were
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Table 9 | Summary of hypothesis testing.
Hypothesis Finding
Hypothesis 1: Individual performance incentives positively influence in-role behaviors after controlling for autonomous motivation Supported
Hypothesis 2: Organizational performance incentives positively influence in-role behaviors after controlling for autonomous motivation Rejected
Hypothesis 3: Individual performance incentives have a stronger (more positive) influence on in-role behaviors than organizational
performance incentives
Supported
Hypothesis 4: Individual performance incentives negatively influence autonomous motivation Rejected
Hypothesis 5: Organizational performance incentives negatively influence autonomous motivation. Rejected
Hypothesis 6: Autonomous motivation positively influences in-role behaviors. Rejected
Hypothesis 7: Autonomous motivation positively influences championing behaviors Supported
Hypothesis 8: Autonomous motivation has a stronger (more positive) influence on championing behaviors than in-role behaviors Supported
Hypothesis 9: Autonomous motivation negatively mediates the influence of individual performance incentives on in-role behaviors Rejected
Hypothesis 10: Autonomous motivation negatively mediates the influence of organizational performance incentives on in-role behaviors Rejected
Hypothesis 11: Autonomous motivation negatively mediates the influence of individual performance incentives on championing behaviors Rejected
Hypothesis 12: Autonomous motivation negatively mediates the influence of organizational performance incentives on championing
behaviors
Rejected
Hypothesis 13: Organizational support positively influences autonomous motivation Supported
Hypothesis 14: Organizational support positively influences championing behaviors Rejected
Hypothesis 15: Autonomous motivation positively mediates the influence of organizational support on in-role behaviors Rejected
Hypothesis 16: Autonomous motivation positively mediates the influence of organizational support on championing behaviors Supported
Hypothesis 17: Share vision positively influences autonomous motivation Supported
Hypothesis 18: Share vision positively influences championing behaviors Supported
Hypothesis 19: Autonomous motivation positively mediates the influence of shared vision on in-role behaviors Rejected
Hypothesis 20: Autonomous motivation positively mediates the influence of shared vision on championing behaviors Supported
Table 10 | Construct paths w/opposite significance and regression differences >0.02.
Construct paths Under 45 45 and over
Coefficient T -value Coefficient T -value
Organizational support (O-SUP) ⇒ Championing behaviors (C-BEH) 0.259 3.575 0.137 1.285
Autonomous motivation (AMOT) ⇒ Championing behaviors (C-BEH) 0.346 2.486 0.151 0.494
Organizational incentives (O-INC) ⇒ In-role behaviors (I-BEH) −0.179 −2.627 −0.033 −0.298
Shared vision (S-VIS) ⇒ In-role behaviors (I-BEH) 0.146 1.931 0.388 2.975
Autonomous motivation (AMOT) ⇒ In-role behaviors (I-BEH) 0.570 4.023 −0.152 −0.465
Individual incentives (IINC) ⇒ Autonomous motivation (AMOT) 0.020 0.501 0.173 2.846
Coefficients listed are unstandardized regression weights.
invariant across the manager age groups. Releasing each of the
constraints across age groups revealed specific differences of how
our hypothesized model applied to managers over and under 45
years old. Table 8 provides information useful in deciphering and
discussing these differences in the next sections.
The structural model also controlled for acquisition age,
manager tenure and manager gender. Of nine possible effects
(nine paths connecting three controls to two dependent and
one mediating variables), only two were significant. Managers’
tenure was likely to positively influence their in-role behav-
iors (unstandardized regression coefficient = 0.155; t-value 2.77)
and acquisition age was likely to positively influence managers’
autonomousmotivation (unstandardized regression coefficient=
0.125; t-value 2.26).
DISCUSSION
Results of the hypotheses tested are shown in Table 9. For a listing
of r2 values, regression coefficients and t-values please refer to
Table 6 and Figure 3.
INFLUENCES ON CHAMPIONING BEHAVIORS
The combination of performance incentives, organizational sup-
port, shared vision and autonomous motivation accounted for
50% of the variance in championing behaviors. Shared vision
had a direct, positive and highly likely influence on championing
behaviors. In fact, it was the only independent variable to have a
direct positive impact on championing behaviors.
Shared vision also indirectly influenced championing behav-
iors via autonomous motivation, indicating partial mediation.
The total effect of shared vision on championing behaviors was
0.286. Comparing the total effects of the independent variables,
shared vision had a stronger impact on championing behaviors
than individual incentives, organizational incentives and organi-
zational support combined.
An unexpected finding indicated that individual performance
incentives directly reduced championing behaviors. At first
glance, this was counterintuitive because individual incentives
target in-role behaviors only. However, researchers have proposed
an inverse relationship between in-role and organizational
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citizenship behaviors (OCBs). Bergeron (2007) proposed that
under an outcome based reward system, increases in OCBs will
result in decreases in in-role behaviors and vice-versa. Given the
fact that OCBs and championing behaviors are both forms of
extra-role behaviors (Morrison and Phelps, 1999), it appears that
our findings reflect Bergeron’s work.
The mediation analysis reported a significant and positive
indirect mediation between organizational support and cham-
pioning behaviors via autonomous motivation. In this case,
the indirect mediation at nearly 50% stronger than the non-
significant direct effect, 0.09 vs. 0.06, respectively.
The mediation analysis also showed that autonomous moti-
vation partially mediated the influence of individual incen-
tives on championing behaviors. This finding conflicted with
the unconstrained analysis in Figure 3 depicting the path
between individual incentives and autonomous motivation as
non-significant (negating mediation). As such, the mediation
analysis provided the more accurate assessment of the media-
tion relationship by isolating individual paths to better exam-
ine their effects and by using bias-corrected bootstrapping for
estimation.
The resulting finding indicated that autonomous motivation
positively mediated the influence of individual incentives on
championing behaviors. However, the unexpected negative direct
effect between individual incentives and championing behaviors
resulted in a negative total effect. It should also be noted that the
positive indirect effect of individual incentives on championing
behaviors was very weak. The regression coefficient of 0.03 was
only 25% of the direct effect.
Finally, organizational support did not positively influence
championing behaviors. In addition to a low t-value of 1.55,
organizational support had a weak influence on championing
behaviors with a regression coefficient of 0.06.
INFLUENCES ON IN-ROLE BEHAVIORS
The combination of performance incentives, organizational sup-
port, shared vision and autonomous motivation accounted
for only 18% of the variance in in-role behaviors. Of the
three hypothesized direct effects, only one, individual incentives
had a significant effect. Neither organizational incentives nor
autonomous motivation significantly influenced in-role behav-
iors. Because autonomous motivation did not significantly influ-
ence in-role behaviors, none of the mediation hypotheses for
in-role behaviors were significant. However, we caution the con-
fidence in this finding because of the high standard error of 0.155
for the autonomous motivation (AMOT) → in-role behaviors
(IBEH) path which certainly increases the chance for a Type 1
error. A lower standard error would negate the rejection of several
of the mediation hypotheses, substantially changing the findings
of the overall study. In consideration of subsequent research,
researcher should improve the items measuring autonomous
motivation to achieve more accurate predictions of mediation
hypotheses.
The most interesting finding here was how little organiza-
tional incentives influenced in-role behaviors. With a direct effect
of −0.021, indirect effect of 0.004 and total effect of −0.017,
all values were non-significant. This finding suggested that the
common practice of providing substantial organizational incen-
tives to M&A managers is totally ineffective.
An unexpected finding revealed that shared vision directly
and positively influenced in-role behaviors. In fact, the influ-
ence of shared vision on in-role behaviors was 35% stronger than
the influence of individual incentives on in-role behaviors with
regression coefficients of 0.17 and 0.11, respectively. This is quite
intriguing considering the strong pay-performance link between
individual incentives and in-role behaviors asserted in compensa-
tion literature (Bucklin and Dickinson, 2001; McGee et al., 2006).
We believe this may be an engaging topic for further research.
The previous section discussed the opposite effects that indi-
vidual incentives had on in-role and championing behaviors and
how it supported the work of Bergeron (2007). In other words,
these opposite effects mimicked the inverse relationship between
in-role and OCBs proposed by Bergeron. A similar phenomenon
was caused by the negative direct effect of organizational support
on in-role behaviors vs. the positive indirect effect of organi-
zational support on championing behaviors. As organizational
support increased, championing behaviors increased and in-role
behaviors decreased.
INFLUENCES ON AUTONOMOUS MOTIVATION
The combination of performance incentives, organizational sup-
port, and shared vision accounted for 41% of the variance
in autonomous motivation. Organizational support and shared
vision were the major predictors of autonomous motivation vir-
tually contributing all of the effect. Conversely, the regression
coefficients linking individual and organizational incentives to
autonomous motivation were among the weakest in the study at
0.04 and 0.02, respectively. This is an interesting outcome con-
sidering SDT posits that incentives decrease autonomous moti-
vation. In this study and setting, SDT did not hold. In fact,
the effects of performance incentives on autonomous motivation
paled in comparison to the effects of organizational support and
shared vision on autonomous motivation.
COMPARATIVE HYPOTHESES
Hypotheses 3 and 8 predicted the comparative strengths of two
pairs of conceptualized paths. Hypothesis 3 asserted that the
stronger pay-performance link between individual incentives and
in-role behaviors would result in a stronger influence than orga-
nizational incentives. The influence of individual incentives was
not only substantially stronger but was significant as compared to
a weak and non-significant effect for organizational incentives.
Hypothesis 8 posited that autonomous motivation would be a
stronger predictor of championing behaviors than in-role behav-
iors. The data supported this hypothesis. The regression coef-
ficient for its effect on championing behaviors was 3.5 times
stronger than its effect on in-role behaviors. In addition, the data
suggested much more confidence in the ability of autonomous
motivation to predict championing behaviors with a t-value of
5.06 compared to 1.19.
CONTROLS
The multigroup SEM analysis indicated that the structural
model was invariant across senior and middle managers but not
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invariant across managers over and under 45 years old. Table 8
lists the regression coefficients and t-values for each path of the
diagram depicted in Figure 3 for managers over and under 45
years old.
Referring to Table 8, there are 13 paths that AMOS reported
as significantly different for managers under vs. over 45 years old.
Of the 13 paths, 8 of them disagreed on significance, that is, one
path was significant and the other was not significant. Of those
8 paths, 6 of them have regression coefficients with differences
>0.02. These 6 paths represent the major differences in construct
relationships between managers under 45 and those over 45 and
are listed in Table 10.
Per Table 10, the championing behaviors of managers
under 45 were more sensitive to organizational support and
autonomous motivation than those over 45. The regression coef-
ficients for younger managers were roughly twice the strength of
these effects on older managers. The in-role behaviors of younger
managers were also more sensitive to organizational incentives
and autonomous motivation, reporting regression coefficients
between 3.8 and 5.4 times those for older managers. These find-
ings indicated that younger managers cared more about how the
organization perceives them. The behaviors of younger managers
were also more influenced by how much they internalized the
organization’s goals (autonomous motivation). In general, the
data indicated that younger managers were much more sensitive
to the support, incentives and goals of the organization than older
managers.
Conversely, older managers cared more about shared vision,
defined in this study as their alignment with the overall direc-
tion and purpose of the organization. Shared vision positively
influenced the in-role behaviors of older managers more than
2.5 times that of younger managers. As individuals age, they are
less likely to look for a new job (Martin, 1979; Griffeth et al.,
2000). In mergers and acquisitions, individuals who identify with
the vision of the organization are also less likely to look for a
new job and more likely to increase their performance (Haslam,
2001; Cartwright, 2005). These two notions suggest that older
M&A employees should be more sensitive to shared vision and
that increases in shared vision should reduce turnover intent and
increase performance.
The multigroup analysis also indicated that individual incen-
tives influenced the autonomous motivation of older man-
agers much more than younger managers. However, because
autonomous motivation did not significantly influence either in-
role or championing behaviors of older managers, this finding
doesn’t matter. Regardless of how much individual incentives
impact the autonomousmotivation of older managers, it does not
significantly influence their behaviors.
The structural model controlled for acquisition age, manager
tenure and manager gender. Of the nine possible effects, only two
effects were significant. First, the findings reported a positive rela-
tionship between manager tenure and in-role behaviors with a
regression coefficient of 0.16 and t-value of 2.77. This outcome
seems intuitive as one would expect managers to become more
efficient in their formal, in-role behaviors over time.
The findings also reported a significant positive relationship
between acquisition age and autonomous motivation with a
regression coefficient of 0.13 and a t-value of 2.26. These effects
were consistent with researchers who posit that it takes time for
employees to reconcile their feelings of uncertainty regarding
large-scale organizational change (Liu and Perrewé, 2005), result-
ing in a temporary reduction in work motivation, specifically in
mergers and acquisitions (Seo and Hill, 2005).
M&A PRACTICE IS WRONG ON CHAMPIONING BEHAVIORS
The findings directly conflict with one of the most common and
longstandingM&A assumptions that organizational performance
incentives induce discretionary behaviors from acquired man-
agers (Kaplan, 2000; Hitt et al., 2001; Larsson and Finkelstein,
2002). According to the data, organizational incentives did not
significantly affect championing behaviors directly or indirectly.
In fact, AMOS reported the total effect of organizational incen-
tives on championing behaviors at a negligible 0.01.
These findings suggest that the ubiquitous use of stock options
and profit sharing plans in M&A may be a waste of time
and money. Seemingly, the implication to practice would be to
eliminate organizational performance incentives. However, the
practice of offering acquired manager’s stock options and profit
sharing has become an expected practice. These expectations may
contribute to the loss of incentive power, possibly explaining the
poor effects of these incentives on manager behaviors. In either
case, should an acquirer fail to offer organizational incentives or
offer substantially reduced versions, the effect on management
morale and turnover could be devastating to the company. This
dilemma suggests an agenda for future research, exploring the
effects of various levels of organizational performance incentives
on managerial morale, turnover and performance in an M&A
context.
M&A PRACTICE IS WRONG ON SHARED VISION
Shared vision was the only independent variable that positively
influenced both championing and in-role behaviors. Surprisingly,
shared vision impacted in-role behaviors more than individual
performance incentives, despite its strong pay-performance link.
Shared vision was also one of only two variables to significantly
influence autonomous motivation.
One of the first duties of acquirers is to establish performance
incentives of their newly acquired managers. In fact, stock incen-
tives for CEOs and senior managers are usually established prior
to the official transaction as part of the legal paperwork Details
of profit sharing plans and individual performance bonuses soon
follow.
The study findings imply that M&A practitioners should
establish a higher priority on shared vision. Other researchers
have identified shared vision as essential to the successful perfor-
mance of merged and acquired organizations (Haspeslagh and
Jemison, 1991; Sitkin and Pablo, 2005). Serial acquirers such
as GlaxoSmithKline and Cisco Systems promote shared vision
as an important part of their acquisition successes (DiGeorgio,
2001; Stahl and Mendenhall, 2005). Whereas, these sources base
their arguments on qualitative findings, the present study con-
tributes quantitative evidence to support the importance of
shared vision, directly comparing their effects to those of perfor-
mance incentives in an M&A context. Furthermore, the strength
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of the quantitative results suggests that M&A practitioners should
prioritize shared vision above performance incentives.
INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES AND PRGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT
Study findings indicated that individual incentives positively
influenced in-role behaviors and negatively influenced champi-
oning behaviors. The absolute strengths of these bipolar effects
were almost identical with direct effects of 0.11 and−0.12, respec-
tively. This finding was consistent with the assertions of some
practitioners and researchers that individual incentives can work
“too well,” causing individuals to focus almost exclusively on in-
role behaviors to the detriment of extra-role behaviors (Kohn
and Thompson, 1993; Wright et al., 1993; Deckop et al., 1999;
Hall and Murphy, 2003). Acquirers commonly address this issue
by providing organizational incentives in addition to individual
incentives to induce extra-role behaviors that foster cooperation
and teamwork (FitzRoy and Kraft, 1995). Our findings supported
the idea that individual incentives decrease championing behav-
iors but did not support the idea that introducing organizational
incentives would offset the decrease.
The data did support the idea that increasing organizational
support would offset the negative effects of individual incen-
tives on championing behaviors. Organizational support posi-
tively influenced championing behaviors (indirect effect 0.09) but
also negatively influenced in-role behaviors (direct effect −0.13).
This supports the work of researchers who argue that focus on
extra-role behaviors reduce the performance of in-role behaviors
(Bergeron, 2007).
By highlighting the gains and costs of increasing individual
incentives and organizational support, the study findings pro-
vide insights for cultivating desired managerial behaviors. For
example, increasing organizational support for managers charged
with large-scale change efforts should help foster the champi-
oning behaviors required to overcome resistance to aggressive
growth and change. Conversely, increasing individual perfor-
mance incentives should help cultivate the in-role behaviors of
managers charged with sustaining day-to-day operational effi-
ciencies, especially during periods of environmental disruptions
typical in M&As.
AGE MATTERS
The effect of organizational support on younger managers’ cham-
pioning behaviors was roughly 2 times stronger than older
managers. The effect of organizational incentives on younger
managers’ in-role behaviors were over five times stronger than
older managers. The degree that younger managers internalized
current organizational goals (autonomous motivation) affected
their championing and in-role behaviors 2–3.5 times more than
older managers. In contrast, shared vision influenced the in-
role behaviors of older managers 2.5 times more than younger
managers.
These findings imply a difference in temporal focus for
younger vs. older managers. The items of concern for younger
managers, organizational support, incentives and current goals
represent current actions, promises or objectives. The concern
for older managers, shared vision, focuses more on what the
company will become in the future. While plausible, there is
little evidence in the scope of the present study to support this
explanation. However, this may be an interesting topic for future
research.
As mentioned earlier, the effect of organizational incentives on
younger managers’ in-role behaviors were over five times stronger
than older managers. This statistic implies that older managers
performed their formal duties more consistently than younger
managers, despite fluctuations in organizational incentives. This
implication was supported by the substantially lower standard
deviation for in-role behaviors of older vs. younger managers at
0.62 vs. 0.77. In addition, the mean for in-role behaviors of older
managers (3.85) was higher than younger managers (3.72), infer-
ring that older managers performed their formal duties better
than younger managers as well as more consistently. The data sug-
gests that acquirers should note the ages of their managers when
designing organizational incentive plans.
LIMITATIONS
The researchers acknowledge several limitations of this study.
First, the study is cross-sectional which means the causal rela-
tionships can only be hypothesized from previous research and
theory. Future research should utilize a longitudinal approach as
a more rigorous analysis of our proposed causal relationships.
Second, common method variance was present due to the
nature of the self-report data. Therefore, we modeled a latent
common method factor that was constrained to load equally on
all observed variables in the measurement and structural models.
By doing so, we attempted to partial out the variance due to the
common method.
Finally, the sample included M&As owned by private equity
firms only. This is but one segment of many in the M&A domain.
Replication of the study exploring other segments would be
required to test the generalizability of our findings.
CONCLUSION
To our knowledge, this is the first M&A study to integrate finan-
cial and psychological drivers of managerial performance into a
single testablemodel. Although this initial study certainly requires
further testing and refinement, we assert that the findings provide
valuable insights toward understanding the drivers of manage-
rial behaviors within mergers and acquisitions. Specifically, the
study provides evidence that shared vision is far more effective at
driving managerial performance, as defined by in-role and cham-
pioning behaviors, than common M&A practices of providing
financial incentives. This is an important step forward in reducing
the dismal failure rates that continue to plague the M&A domain.
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